http_gun/client_identity

An immutable TLS client certificate and private-key snapshot.

Applications read credentials from their own secret store, then admit the PEM values with from_pem. No file is read again on connection replacement. Bind the identity with config.with_client_identity before starting a client. Server trust and hostname checks remain enabled and independently configured.

Rotate by starting a new client with the new identity, directing new work to it, then stopping the old client. Await and consume old application results before stop when they must be retained: shutdown grace covers active HTTP leases, and pool exit ends retained body access. Old exchanges retain their old identity until completion or grace expiry. Views cannot change identity.

Identity/configuration values contain private material in memory. Opacity prevents construction or inspection through this API; it is not encryption. Do not log arbitrary configuration or runtime state. HTTP Gun never includes configured identity material in its error descriptions, events or cassettes.

Types

Error

</>

PEM admission failure. No variant contains certificate or private-key input.

pub type Error {
  InvalidCertificateChain
  InvalidPrivateKey
  EncryptedPrivateKey
}

Constructors

```
InvalidCertificateChain
```
```
InvalidPrivateKey
```
```
EncryptedPrivateKey
```

Identity

</>

An admitted in-memory certificate chain and private key. There is no public constructor or accessor for the credential material.

pub type Identity

Values

describe_error

</>

pub fn describe_error(error: Error) -> String

A bounded diagnostic that never includes credential input.

from_pem

</>

pub fn from_pem(
  certificates: String,
  private_key: String,
) -> Result(Identity, Error)

Decode a nonempty PEM certificate chain, leaf first, and exactly one unencrypted PEM private key. This is pure: it starts no process and performs no filesystem or network operation. OTP owns PEM and DER decoding.

Admission verifies decoding, not trust, expiry, permitted usage, negotiated algorithms or certificate/key pairing. Those remain TLS connection decisions and can fail with the ordinary typed transport cause/submission evidence. Decrypt encrypted keys in the application’s credential boundary before this call; HTTP Gun owns no password callback, secret store or file watcher.